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The Inequality of Anti-establishment 
William P. Marshall* 
Already in this Conference, one thing has become obvious. 
Religion Clause jurisprudence creates strange and shifting 
alliances and there is little predictability as to how one's 
political stance will affect one's approach to specific religion 
clause issues.' For example, I note that Professor Pepper is 
aligned with former Solicitor General Starr in a combined 
attack on Smith: yet, I suspect, these two would disagree on 
most other constitutional issues, including those decided in Lee 
U. Wei~man.~ 
Smith, of course, has been roundly attacked elsewhere and 
the previous presentations of Pepper and Starr suggest that it 
is likely to receive significant negative comment here. I am 
therefore tempted, as one of Smith's few supporters, to spend 
my time defending the Smith decision. I do not plan to do so, 
however. Rather, I will test Smith's validity by applying my 
understanding of the case to Establishment Clause issues. 
Specifically, I will attempt to reconcile how the rationale that I 
believe justifies Smith (i.e., the principle of equality of ideas) 
can be found inapposite when applied to  Establishment Clause 
issues. To state the issue as succinctly as possible, I will 
discuss whether it is consistent to single out religious belief 
systems for adverse treatment under the Establishment Clause 
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I would 
like to express my appreciation to  Cole Durham and Fred Gedicks for organizing 
this Conference and honoring me with their invitation. I am especially grateful 
because Professors Durham and Gedicks are two of the most thoughthl and 
respected constitutional law professors in the country, and their work is some of 
the best there is. It is always a privilege to meet with them and exchange ideas. I 
am also pleased to once again be on the same panel as Steve Pepper. Professor 
Pepper and I have been disagreeing over religion clause issues for ten years, and I 
always learn much from our debates. Finally, it is an honor for me to be here 
with the former Solicitor General of the United States, Mr. Kenneth Starr. 
1. See Michael W. McConnell, You Can't Tell the Players in Church-State 
Disputes Without a Scorecard, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 27 (1987). 
2. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
if all belief systems are purportedly equal, as I have argued in 
my Smith defen~e.~ 
Of course, in one sense, this purported inconsistency is 
easily avoided. After all, the First Amendment's commitment to 
the equality-of-ideas principle applies when the ideas in 
question are those of private actors-not the government. The 
establishment restriction, on the other hand, applies only to 
government speech. Nevertheless, I think i t  fair t o  say that to 
the extent the establishment prohibition singles out religious 
ideas for adverse treatment, it runs counter to the general 
theory of the equality of ideas even if it does not run counter to 
specific constitutional prohibitions. 
In any event, before addressing my central subject, let me 
quickly step back and explain how an equality-of-belief-systems 
notion works to justify Smith. My point, I believe, is best made 
by reference to two free exercise decisions decided prior to 
Smith. 
The first case is Wisconsin v. Y ~ d e r . ~  In Yoder, the Court 
granted the Amish a free exercise religous exemption from 
compulsory school attendance. In its opinion, however, the 
Court was equally clear that persons who objected to 
compulsory education based upon secular principles would not 
be entitled to constitutional relief? The second case is Thomas 
v. Review Board.' In Thomas, a person who protested, on 
account of his religious beliefs, having to work in an armament 
factory was granted a free exercise exemption from 
unemployment insurance requirements. Again the Court 
declared that if a person's objections were based on moral, 
philosophical, or political principles, she would not be entitled 
to constitutional relief. 
My thesis, in defending Smith, was that these results were 
inappropriate in that they preferred one type of belief system 
(i.e., religious) over all others? Why should religious objections 
to compulsory education or armaments work receive 
4. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) [hereinafter, Marshall, Defense]; William P. Marshall, 
The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90). 
5. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
6. The Court used the example of followers of Henry David Thoreau to 
illustrate those who would not be entitled to constitutional exemption. Id. at 216. 
7. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
8. Marshall, Defense, supra note 4, at 319-20. 
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constitutional exemption from neutral laws of general 
applicability, while parallel secular objections based upon 
political, philosophical, or moral principle do not? Such a result, 
I argued, not only creates bad policy under the Free Exercise 
Clause, but also offends the central principle of freedom of 
speech-that there is an equality in the realm of ideas.g Under 
this principle, all ideas, regardless of whether they are based 
on religious or secular beliefs, should be entitled to equal 
constitutional status. 
This "equality of principle," it should be noted, does not 
always work to  the detriment of the religious claimant as it did 
in Smith. In other circumstances, it may work to vindicate the 
religious claimant. For example, in Widmar v. Vincent1' the 
Court held that the equality principle prohibited religious 
speech from being singled out for disfavored treatment under 
the Free Speech Clause. Indeed, the lesson after Smith and 
Widmar might well be that the commitment to  the principle of 
the equality of ideas exists in two of the clauses of the First 
AmendmentFree Exercise and Free Speech. As we shall see, 
however, the principle has not been applied to the 
Establishment Clause. 
In Lee v. Weisman," Justice Kennedy, comparing freedom 
of religion and freedom of speech, wrote as follows: 
The Ers t  Amendment protects speech and religion by quite 
different mechanisms. Speech is protected by insuring its full 
expression even when the government participates, for the 
very object of some of our most important speech is to 
persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own. The 
method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of 
conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In 
religious debate or expression the government is not a prime 
participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment 
antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free Exercise Clause 
embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close 
parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, 
but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on 
forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise 
counterpart in the speech pro~isions.'~ 
9. Id. at 312-13; see also K e ~ e t h  L. Karst, Equality as a Centml Primipk in 
the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 25 (1975). 
10. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
11. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
12. Id. at 2657 (citations omitted). 
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In short, secular ideas can win, while religious ideas cannot. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion, for the most part,13 is 
descriptively accurate. The question is how can this announced 
inequality, supposedly mandated by the Establishment Clause, 
be justified? Two possible answers are immediately apparent. 
The first is textual. The Establishment Clause applies only to 
religion. The second is common sense. I am aware of no one 
who actually believes that an anti-establishment provision is 
not, at least in some sense, beneficial. No one is arguing for 
theocracy. Text and common sense, however, while providing 
quick answers, do not set forth the underlying rationale. What 
is it that supports the contention that religious ideas may not 
prevail in the political process while secular ideas may prevail? 
A number of nonpersuasive reasons might be offered to 
support this contention. One such reason might be that religion 
is not political, and therefore, its exclusion from the political 
process is not troublesome. This contention, however, fails on a 
number of counts. First, freedom of speech protects not only 
political speech, but also other kinds of speech." Second, and 
more importantly, religion is political. The religious idea 
presented in Thomas, that a person should not work in an 
armament factory, is politically laden. Similarly, the religious 
belief advanced in Bob Jones University v. United States,15 
that it is appropriate to  engage in racial discrimination, is, 
under any definition, political. Moreover, even when religion is 
not overtly political, religious ideas have political effects. 
Religious principles inform the morality which in turn informs 
the political process. 
A second justification for excluding religious ideas from the 
political process might be that such ideas are not dialogic. This 
contention is also not persuasive, and it is descriptively 
inaccurate. Religion can, and often is, susceptible to reasoned 
and dispassionate discussion. Moreover, and in any event, 
dialogic qualities are not the touchstones of First Amendment 
13. While Justice Kennedy is correct that religious ideas may not "win" in the 
political process, he may have overstated the ability of non-religious ideas to 
prevail. As Justice Jackson wrote in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), "[ilf there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." 
14. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
15. 461 US. 574 (1983). 
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protection. I need not repeat the statement that was protected 
in Cohen v. Calif~rnia,'~ but the utterance was clearly not a 
model of rational and dispassionate debate. 
A third argument for excluding religious ideas from the 
political process might be that religion depends on a different 
epistemology than does speech. While speech depends on 
notions of rationality, religion purportedly depends upon non- 
rational belief. This is an interesting and complex objection to 
which we could devote a significant amount of time. 
Fortunately, however, Professor Gedicks has already done our 
work for us. In a recent article, he thoughtfully refuted the 
epistemology contention, and in my opinion he is right." In a 
postmodern world with no notion of objective truth, one cannot 
claim that rational precepts are epistemologically superior to 
non-rational beliefs. The argument simply does not work. 
A fourth position might be that religious ideas are 
especially dangerous. Again this is unconvincing. Although we 
shall subsequently return to  a discussion of how religious 
volatility may be of special concern,18 the dangerousness of 
ideas cannot automatically distinguish religion from non- 
religion. Certainly religious ideas can be dangerous, but so are 
many non-religious ideas. After all, as Holmes stated, "every 
idea is an incitement."lg 
A fAh argument might be that religious ideas can 
threaten religious freedom. Descriptively this is, of course, 
accurate. There are existing religious systems which profess 
that their word is the only word, and that every other word is 
heresy and should be destroyed. Undoubtedly, these ideas 
threaten religious freedom. But again, in speech clause 
jurisprudence, the fact that some speech might threaten or  
attack freedom of speech does not remove that form of speech 
from constitutional prote~tion.~~ 
A sixth justification alluded to  by Professor Pepper is that 
religion should be separated from government because when 
religion gets involved in government, religion itself is 
weakened. Under this theory, the anti-establishment mandate 
16. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
17. Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Lzfe and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 
671 (1992). 
18. See i@a notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
19. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
20. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
916 (1978). 
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is designed not only to  protect government from religion but 
also to protect religion from government. From this angle, 
treating religion differently than speech might be defended as a 
pro-religion position. 
This contention does come with a strong pedigree. It was 
originally raised by Roger Williams and undoubtedly influenced 
the Framers. The position is also sound. Ideas do become 
compromised when they enter the political. process. 
Nevertheless, I am not sure that even if government acceptance 
does dilute ideas, that this alone is a reason to impose a First 
Amendment restriction upon ideas entering the political 
marketplace. At best it suggests that religion is best served by 
imposing the limitation on itself. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee does not rely 
on the Roger Williams rationale. Rather, Justice Kennedy's 
explanation, in his words, "lies in the history that was and is 
the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in 
the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant 
expression of religious views may end in a policy to 
indoctrinate and coerce."21 It is in this passage that Justice 
Kennedy provides the compelling reasons why religion is not 
allowed to "win" in the political process, or in other words, why 
an equality-of-ideas principle should not be allowed to trump 
establishment concerns. 
As Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests, when religion 
"wins," problems arise. The reasons for this were alluded to  in 
two talks that have already been given. Both former Solicitor 
General Starr and Professor Pepper were concerned about the 
manner in which religion behaved.22 Both of them brought up 
images of Bosnia and the ravages created when one particular 
religion controls government in a multi-religious society. Yet 
what is it about the union of religion and government that 
leads to  such devastation? Let us quickly turn to this issue. 
The religion clauses of the First Amendment and their 
history suggest a dichotomy. On the one hand, they represent 
the principle that religion and religious freedom are important 
and seminal to a free society. On the other, they suggest there 
is another side to  religion-one that creates a special danger 
21. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2657. 
22. Kenneth G. Starr, Liberty and EqualiEy Under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1; Stephen L. Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms 
of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7,  61 & 11.166. 
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that is ultimately threatening to freedom.23 This danger, 
however, does not stem from the substance of religious ideas. 
Rather, the danger arises from how the individual utilizes 
religion in structuring her existence-how in essence the 
believer uses religion to define herself. The specific tenets of 
belief (religious ideas) are in many cases wholly irrelevant to 
the self-defining process. Indeed, religion, for some, is not a 
method of developing or examining one's beliefs at all. Rather, 
it is a method used to shield the believer from facing 
uncertainties. Religion, in the words of one sociologist, becomes 
a system of holding mechanisms that keep the believer from 
facing the questions which must terrify humanity-What is 
God? What is meaning? What is life?24 
Because of this, some believers develop a passionate 
adherence to their beliefs which leads to an us-versus-them 
mentality with respect to those who do not share their belief 
systems.25 Competing belief systems are then seen as threats 
to the individual's sense of self. For some, this means that the 
competing belief systems must therefore be attacked. When 
this happens the believer may seek to wholly eradicate the 
opposing belief systems which she feels are so threatening. In 
this way, religious persecution and intolerance are created not 
by the ideas of religion, but by the psychology of adhesion to 
religious beliefs-a psychology which seeks not to understand 
or address religious issues but rather to avoid them, 
paradoxically, by passionate and unquestioned devotion to 
them. This is the type of religious belief and reaction we have 
seen surface in India, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and 
the Baltics. In this respect, it is worth noting that religious 
wars are many things, but they are seldom a battle over ideas. 
The dangers created by the nature of unquestioned 
adherence to religious belief, moreover, are exacerbated 
because the believer becomes particularly susceptible to 
manipulation by government and political leaders. As I have 
suggested else~here:~ it  is not the religious leaders who 
advocate crhches a t  city halls, i t  is the political leaders. The 
23. See William P .  Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 
(forthcoming 1993). 
24. JAMES BREECH, THE SILENCE OF JESUS 46 (1983). 
25. See generdly MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE (Willard 
Trask trans., 1959). 
26. William P. Marshall, Is the Constitutional Concern with Religious 
Involvement in the Public Square Hostility? 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 308 (1992). 
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lesson is clear: there is political hay to be made in appealing to  
the religious sentiments of the political majority. 
It is because of this understanding of the dangers of 
religion that Justice Kennedy is right in acknowledging that 
there must be a special limitation which prevents religion from 
"winning" government. When the state is used to advance 
religion's self-reinforcement mechanisms, then the danger of 
coercion and oppression of opposing groups becomes 
paramount. 
For this reason, I would suggest that my Smith 
argument-that total equality among belief systems is required 
by the First Amendment-is not fully accurate. The 
.Establishment Clause does provide an exception. But I would 
not retreat from my position that there remains an overall 
commitment to an equality among ideas. The establishment ' 
prohibition is not based upon a concern with religious ideas but 
with potential religious behavior. 
In a sense this is good news. Once it is realized that it is 
not the inclusion of religious ideas that triggers the 
establishment prohibition, but rather the attempt by religion to 
use government to reinforce its own "holding mechanisms" and 
tools of self-identification, then it makes sense that the 
establishment prohibition should not be applied to invalidate 
state laws only because those laws have some religious 
component. Thus, under this understanding, cases such as 
Harris u. MCRU~~ '  or Bowers u. Hard~ick,~'  which suggest 
that there is no Establishment Clause violation simply because 
the prohibitions on abortion or homosexuality have some 
religious basis, are correctly decided. Indeed, if religion's 
attempts to use the political processes to reinforce its self- 
identity are the crux of the establishment prohibition, then I 
might agree with former Solicitor General Starr when he said 
that Lee u. Weisman could come out differently if viewed as an 
equality-of-expression case rather than an attempt to get the 
government to promote religious practice. The key to the 
establishment inquiry quite rightly becomes whether 
government is being used to  endorse religion, not whether 
there is any religious component to the challenged acti~ity.~' 
27. 448 US. 297, 298 (1980). 
28. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
29. See Lynch v. Domelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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In sum, the establishment prohibition does in some sense 
transgress the equality-of-ideas principle. However, the 
constitutionally imposed inequality is narrow and is not based 
upon a negative inference as to the inherent value of religious 
ideas or practices. It is based upon the danger of allowing 
religion, not religious ideas, to prevail in the political process. 
